동양사-[춘천시]24일 시청광장 아이스링크 개장…대형 스크린 겨울왕국 상영 | 군포철쭉축제

II. 주요국의 법리 1. 일본 가. 모인의 의의 특허를 받을 수 있는 권리는 원시적으로 자연인인 발명자에게 귀속되지만(일본 특 허법 제29조 제1항 본문), 이러한 특허를 받을 수 있는 권리는 양도가 가능하며(동법 제33조, 제34조) 따라서 출원이 가능한 자는 이러한 특허를 받을 수 있는 권리를 가진 자에 한하며 그 이외의 자가 출원을 한 경우에는 거절되고(동법 제49조 제7호), 과오 로 등록된 경우에는 무효사유로 된다(동법 제123조 제1항 제6호). 이와 같이 특허를 772) 조영선, “모인 특허권에 대한 이전청구의 법률문제”, 사법 제39호, 사법발전재단, 2017. 3., 9-10면. 773) 제2설에 대해 출원일 소급제도는 모인특허출원을 무효로 시키는 것이기 때문에 발명의 동일성의 범위를 넓 게 보더라도 정당한 권리자가 실제 발명한 것 이상의 권리를 취득할 위험이 없다고 설명하고 있는데, 거절 무 효되는 범위와 출원일 소급이 인정되는 범위를 동일하게 보면 문제없는 설명이지만, 앞서 본 바와 같이 두 범 위를 달리 보는 견해도 있다.

지방법원과 CAFC는 위 사안에서 원고의 해당 발명에 대한 기여를 인정하여 원고 를 공동발명자로 인정하였다. 원고가 여러 청구항 중 한 종속항이 청구한 발명에서는 545) Arbitron, Inc. v. Kiefl, No. 09-CV-04013, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83597, at *16-17 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 13, 2010) (holding that one scientist who reviewed and built on a report about another's discovery collaborated sufficiently to qualify as joint inventors). 546) Memry Corp. v. Kentucky Oil Tech., N.V., 2007 WL 2746737, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007). 547) IP Innovation v. Red Hat, Inc. (9705 F.Supp.2d 692) (E.D. Tex. 2010). 548) Ultra-Precision Manufacturing, Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 549) Falana v. Kent State University, 669 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. Jan. 23, 2012). 구성요소 부가 특허출원에 의한 영업비밀 기술탈취 방지를 위한 특허법의 공동발명 개선안 연구 182 공동발명자로 인정되지 못하였으나, (넓은 범위를 청구한) 독립항이 청구한 발명에서 는 공동발명자로 인정되었다.

대상 판결은 원고의 아이디어가 피고에게 전달된 사실은 인정되었으나, 원고의 아 이디어와 피고의 대상 발명이 현저히 달라 객관적 요건도 주관적 요건도 인정되지 않 은 것이다. 4) 평가 기재된 발명자가 원고 및 D의 2명이므로 원고의 지분율은 50%로 추정될 것인데, 원고가 그의 역할이 절대적이었던 점을 잘 증명하여 90%로 인정받은 사례이다.

909) Markem v Zipher [2005] R.P.C. 31; CIPA Guide Sixth Edition §7.08 and §37.05. 910) CIPA Guide Seventh Edition §7.08 (“Notwithstanding that, by s.125, the invention for which a patent has been granted is to be taken as that specified in the claims of the patent, the court will not just look at the form of the claims of a pending application to decide what the invention is and who is the deviser of that invention. Moreover, the issue of inventorship can arise even before an application has been filed, or where an application has been filed but no claims have yet been formulated. The Court of Appeal recognised in Markem v Zipher that patent attorneys often draft a first set of claims very broadly so as to get the most out of the search and claims will be amended prior to grant. The issue for the court will be to see what is “the heart” of the invention, even though there may be more than “one heart”, and each claim may not need to be considered a separate “heart” on its own.”); CIPA Guide Seventh Edition §37.05 (“Entitlement is no longer to be decided on a claim by claim basis. Following the Court of Appeal in Markem v Zipher [2005] R.P.C. 31; [2005] EWCA Civ 267, the issue for the court will be to see what is “the heart of the invention” and, even though there may be more than “one heart”, that may not mean that each claim is “a heart”. This is discussed at §7.08.”). 구성요소 부가 특허출원에 의한 영업비밀 기술탈취 방지를 위한 특허법의 공동발명 개선안 연구 350 인정판단에 있어서 선행기술이 고려될 수 있는 것으로 해석되고 있다.911) 모인 판단 시 특허의 유무효가 문제될 수 있는지에 대해 종래 견해는, 모인이 문제 된 발명이 특허요건을 충족하는 여부는 고려될 필요가 없다고 보았지만, 최근 판례에 의해 이러한 실무가 변경된 것으로 보이는데, 특허요건을 충족하지 못한 발명에 대해 귀속 여부를 다툴 실익이 없다는 점을 설시한 판결이 있다.912) 다. 모인출원 특허에 대한 정당한 권리자의 구제 영국은 무권리자 출원 특허에 대한 정당한 권리자의 구제수단으로 이전청구제도 911) Yeda v Rhone Poulenc [2008] R.P.C. 1; UKHL 43, Markem v Zipher [2005] R.P.C. 31; CIPA Guide Sixth Edition §7.08 and §37.04. 912) CIPA Guide Seventh Edition §7.08 (“Issues of validity of claims will be relevant: especially where claim 1 is overly broad. Traditionally entitlement was determined according to the alleged inventor’s perception of what he had discovered, rather than what might turn out in the light of the prior art actually to have been invented. In other words, validity considerations are not generally to be taken into account in assessing entitlement questions and “invention” in this context should not mean a “patentable invention”, see Norris’s Patent [1988] R.P.C. 159 and Viziball’s Application [1988] R.P.C. 213. . . . However, two particular decisions have changed this practice. In Yeda v Rhône-Poulenc Rorer [2008] R.P.C. 1; [2007] UKHL 43, Lord Hoffmann held that s.7(2) provided an exhaustive code to entitlement to the grant of a patent. Section 7(3) defined the inventor as “the actual deviser of the invention”, and so it was necessary to distinguish between the person who had made the invention and the person who had made a non-inventive contribution.“Deciding upon inventorship will therefore involve assessing the evidence adduced by the parties as to the nature of the inventive concept and who contributed to it. In some cases this may be quite complex because the inventive concept is a relationship of discontinuity between the claimed invention and the prior art. Inventors themselves will often not know exactly where it lies.” Also, in Markem v Zipher [2005] R.P.C. 31, the Court of Appeal felt that, as a matter of convenience, if a claim was clearly and unarguably invalid, then not only could the Comptroller take that into account when exercising his wide discretion, and deal accordingly with such claims, he ought to do so as there was no point in “handing rights in an invalid monopoly from one side to another” and “the sooner an obviously invalid monopoly is removed, the better from the public point of view”. Where there was “self-evidently no bone”, the “dogs [should] be prevented from fighting over it”. So Jacob L.J. concluded:“if an inherent part of a claim to entitlement is also an assertion of or acceptance of invalidity, the entitlement claim must fail.” The Hearing Officer proceeded to consider this aspect of Markem in Statoil v University of Southampton BL O/204/05 and found that the principle applied where either of the parties to the entitlement dispute raised the question of validity, and the defendant “should not be allowed to get away with pleading invalidity as an inherent part of his defence”. Thus, questions of patentability can now be raised pre-grant in entitlement proceedings and previous cases to the contrary will no longer be good law. However, care may be needed in applying this where the invention in question is patentable in an overseas jurisdiction but not patentable in the UK (e.g. because it relates to computer software or a method of doing business—as in LIFFE v Pinkava [2007] R.P.C. 30; [2007] EWCA Civ 217).”); CIPA Guide Seventh Edition §37.06 (“Although the traditional position was that validity should not be taken into consideration when deciding questions of entitlement (Norris’s Patent), this did not mean that there was no need to look for any contribution from the referrer to the very feature which distinguishes the claims of the contested application/patent from the prior art (Derbyshire Maid’s Patent BL O/40/97). Now, following Markem v Zipher, the issue can be explored, even without a request for revocation, and where there is a clear and unarguable attack, then there is no point in the Comptroller passing such claims from the defendant to the claimant: see the discussion at §7.08.”). 특허법상 모인(冒認) 법리 351 와 출원일소급제도를 모두 마련하고 있다.

가) 부정적 견해 현행 발명자 판단 기준에 따를 경우 모인대상발명의 발명자가 모인대상발명의 자 명한 변경에 대한 공동발명자로 인정되기는 어려울 것이라는 견해가 있다.850) 나) 긍정적 견해 제135조 모인절차(Derivation Proceedings)를 통해 모인대상발명의 자명한 변경에 대해서도 모인대상발명의 발명자가 공동발명자 또는 단독발명자로 주장하여 구제받 을 수 있다는 견해도 있다.851) 850) Dennis Crouch, The Removal of Section 102(f)’s Inventorship Requirement; the Narrowness of Derivation Proceedings; and the Rise of 101’s Invention Requirement. (“In our prior e-mail communications (repeated here with permission), Sarnoff has also explored other ways to block patenting of the obvious variants. He writes: 1. A person who conceives of an obvious variant is normally treated as an inventor of an invention (just of an obvious one), so lack of inventorship under Section 101 may not be a successful approach to invalidating the claim made by the deriver, although the deriver will likely be entitled at least to joint-inventor status; and 2. Current inventorship law may not necessarily treat the originator of the underlying invention as a joint-inventor of the obvious variant of which the originator did not conceive, even if the originator added a significant contribution to conception by the deriver, and thus it may not always be possible to correct inventorship to permit the originator to obtain joint inventor status and joint ownership of the obvious variant. 3. However, the courts have sometimes extended unpatentability to obvious variants even when the statute does not clearly provide for it, as they did in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (extending Section 102(b) to claims that were obvious in light of statutory bar art).”). Sarnoff 교수의 견해를 소개한 밑줄 부분. (2018. 8. 11. 방문). 851) Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 98 (2012) (“The AIA’s new derivation provisions under § 135, coupled with ancillary changes to the patent statute, provide alternative remedies for a true inventor in the situation where someone has learned of the inventor’s invention (i.e., derived from the inventor non-public knowledge of the type that was at issue in OddzOn) and the deriver sought a patent on the derived subject matter or some obvious variant of that derived knowledge. If an inventor succeeds in such a derivation claim, the inventor can decide which patent application, in which it would then have ownership, should issue as a patent. Thus, the AIA affords an inventor not just an alternative to an OddzOn defense, which merely destroys what might otherwise be valid patent rights, but a superior option that was clearly engineered by Congress as a means to spare patentability.”); Id. at 98 footnote 384 (“In the “obvious variant derived” situation, the later-filing inventor should be able, in many situations, to make a joint inventorship claim, perhaps even a sole inventorship claim, on the obvious variant. This assertion can be advanced on the ground that disclosure of the complete conception of the invention to the deriver made an inventive contribution to the 구성요소 부가 특허출원에 의한 영업비밀 기술탈취 방지를 위한 특허법의 공동발명 개선안 연구 326 3. 독일 가. 모인의 의의 독일에서는 특허의 이의신청 무효 사유의 하나인 ‘모인(widerrechtliche Entnahme)’에 대하여 “특허의 본질적 내용이 타인의 발명의 설명, 도면, 모형, 기기 혹은 장치로부터 혹은 타인이 사용하는 방법으로부터 해당 타인의 동의 없이 취득되 어 있을 것(절취)(독일 특허법 제21조 제1항 제3호 및 제21조 제1항을 인용하는 제22 조)”852)으로 설명하고 있다.

원고가 276특허를 근거로 소외 제3자(International Demographics)를 상대로 특허 권 침해소송을 제기하였으며, 그 소송에서 법원은 276특허의 발명이 모바일 기술 (cellular telephony)을 포섭하는 것으로 해석하였다.512) 피고는 2009년 4월 8일 원고에 게 새로운 편지를 송부하여, 그가 원고에게 제공한 기술이 cellular telephony 기술을 포함하므로 그가 276특허의 발명에 기여한 것이며, 그러므로 공동발명자라고 주장하 였다.

공동발명의 객관적 측면이라는 것은 발명의 성립에 불가결로 필요한 객관적 행위 즉 특징적인 구성요소에 관련되어야 하고 구체적으로 말하면 모델 설정 및 원리를 고 려한 착상에 객관적으로 기여한 것을 말한다.154) 여기서 말한 객관적 측면의 판단은 일반 발명자의 인정기준과 같은 것이다. 그러나 객관적 측면뿐만 아니라 주관적 측면 이 있어야 공동발명으로 인정한다.